Insurance - Family Combination Policy - Interpretation of Owned Automobile Clause by Linsay, Wendell G., Jr.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 23 | Number 4
June 1963
Insurance - Family Combination Policy -
Interpretation of Owned Automobile Clause
Wendell G. Linsay Jr.
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Wendell G. Linsay Jr., Insurance - Family Combination Policy - Interpretation of Owned Automobile Clause, 23 La. L. Rev. (1963)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol23/iss4/14
1963] NOTES
INSURANCE - FAMILY COMBINATION POLICY - INTERPRETATION
OF OWNED AUTOMOBILE CLAUSE
Plaintiff insurance company sought judicial declaration that
liability coverage under its family combination automobile policy
did not extend to an automobile not described in the policy. The
automobile involved belonged to the insured's wife but was
driven by the insured at the time of the accident.' The district
court ruled against plaintiff but the court of appeal reversed,
holding the wife's car was a "non-owned automobile," but not of
a type afforded coverage by the policy.2 The Supreme Court re-
versed and reinstated the district court's judgment. Held, since
the policy's definition of "named insured" included both the in-
sured and his spouse, and "owned automobile" was defined as an
automobile owned by the named insured, the wife's automobile,
although not named therein, was within the policy's coverage for
liability arising out of the use of the owned automobile. Indiana
Lumbermen's Mut. Ins. Co. v. Russell, 243 La. 189, 142 So. 2d
391 (1962).
The Family Combination Automobile Policy provides two
basic types of coverage - for "owned" and "non-owned" automo-
biles. Under its "owned automobile" clause it undertakes to pro-
vide coverage for liability incurred while use is made of the
owned automobile 3 by the named insured, any resident of the
the promise of immunity made a part of the record showing approval by the court;
but such approval should not be mandatory.
1. Although the policy was issued prior to the insured's marriage and his con-
sequent access to his wife's car, it had subsequently been renewed; thus, it would
seem the wife's automobile could not qualify as one newly acquired. The possi-
bility of it being so was not discussed in the majority opinion in the instant case.
For coverage of newly acquired automobiles see note 9 infra.
2. The "non-owned automobile" afforded coverage in the family policy is de-
fined as "an automobile . . . not owned by or furnished for the regular use of
either the named insured or any relative, other than a temporary substitute
automobile." See Hartford Form 8080.
3. The policy in this case is one of the earlier family policies which provided
that an "owned automobile" is an "automobile . . . owned by the named insured
. " The more recent forms define "owned automobile" as:
"(a) . . . [an] automobile described in this policy for which a specific pre-
mium charge indicates that coverage is afforded,
" (b) a trailer owned by the named insured,
"(c) . . . [an] automobile ownership of which is acquired by the named in-
sured during the policy period, provided
"(1) it replaces an owned automobile as defined in (a) above, or
"(2) the company insures all . . . automobiles owned by the named in-
sured on the date of such acquisition and the named insured notifies the com-
pany during the policy period or within 30 days after the date of such acqui-
sition of his election to make this and no other policy issued by the company
applicable to such automobile, or
"(d) a temporary substitute automobile."
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same household, and any other person using such automobile
with the permission of the named insured.4 Under the "non-
owned automobile" clause it seeks to provide coverage for liabil-
ity incurred by the named insured or any relative residing in the
same household even while using a non-owned automobile. 5 The
policy's basic purpose is to provide insurance against liability,
not only to operators of his owned automobile, but also to the
insured and the members of his family, whether the automobile
used is one owned by himself or another person., However, in
order to keep the insurer's risk exposure commensurate with the
premiums charged, owned automobile coverage is limited by a
declaration that the total number of automobiles owned by the
named insured on the effective date of the policy is not to exceed
the number described therein. 7 Furthermore, non-owned auto-
mobile coverage is limited by defining non-owned automobiles
as those "not owned or furnished for the regular use of either
the named insured or any relative."'8 Without such limitations,
a policy with premiums calculated to cover only one automobile
might afford protection to all automobiles owned or regularly
4. One of the more recent Family Automobile Policy forms, which is only
slightly changed from its predecessors, provides in part:
"The following are the insureds under Section I:
"(a) With respect to the owned automobile,
"(1) the named insured and any resident of the same household,
"(2) any other person using such automobile with the permission of the
named insured, provided his actual operation or (if he is not operating) his
actual use thereof is within the scope of such permission, and
"(3) any other person or organization but only with respect to his or its
liability because of acts or omissions of an insured under (a) (1) or (2) above;
"(b) With respect to a non-owned automobile,
"(1) the named insured,
"(2) any relative [who also must be a resident of the same household],
but only with respect to a private passenger automobile or trailer,
provided his actual permission or (if he is not operating) the other actual use
thereof is with the permission, or reasonably 'believed to be with the permission,
of the owner and is within the scope of such permission, and . See Hartford
Form 8080.
5. See note 4 supra; the definition of a non-owned automobile is in note 2
supra.
6. See Parcher, The New Family Automobile Policy, 24 INS. COUNSEL J. 13
(1957).
7. See Mallitz v. Bankers Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 204 F. Supp. 307 (E.D.
La. 1962) ; Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 172 Neb. 179,
109 N.W.2d 126 (1961).
8. See the policy definition of a non-owned automobile in note 2 supra; Lalos
v. Tickler, 103 N.H. 292, 170 A.2d 843 (1961) ; Carr v. Home Indem. Co., 404
Pa. 27, 170 A.2d 588 (1961). The same held true for the Standard Automobile
Policy. See Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Pulsifer, 41 F. Supp. 249 (S.D. Me.
1941) ; Rodenkirk v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 325 Ill. 421, 60 N.E.2d
269 (1945) ; Leteff v. Maryland Cas. Co., 91 So. 2d 123 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957),
18 LA. L. REV. 206; Thornbury, Coverage v. Use of Other Automobiles of the
Standard Automotive Combination Policies, 17 INS. COUNSEL J. 383 (1950).
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used by the named insured or members of his family.9
Inasmuch as an owned automobile was defined as one owned
by the named insured, and the definition of named insured in-
cluded the insured's spouse, the court in the instant case found
the wife's car was intended to be an owned automobile covered
by the policy. This intent was held not to be nullified by the
declaration of the total number of owned automobiles. The court
also cited with approval the case of Lejeune v. State Farm Mut.
Ins. Co.,10 which held that policies were to be construed so as to
be consistent with the rule of the Automobile Casualty Manual
for Louisiana prescribing that if all owned automobiles were not
to be insured an endorsement must be attached." It noted that
9. See Campbell v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 211 F.2d 732 (4th Cir. 1954);
Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Pulsifer, 41 F. Supp. 249 (S.D. Me. 1941) ; Home
Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 52 Del. 42, 152 A.2d 115 (1959) ; Thornbury, Coverage v.
Use of Other Automobiles of the Standard Automotive Combination Policies, 17
INS. COUNSEL J. 383 (1950) ; Annot., 86 A.L.R.2d 937 (1962).
Both temporary substitute automobiles and newly acquired automobiles are
provided coverage under the owned automobile clause by including them within
the definition of an "owned automobile." The policy form further defines a "tem-
porary substitute automobile" as "any automobile or trailer, not owned by the
named insured, while temporarily used with the permission of the owner as a sub-
stitute for the owned automobile or trailer when withdrawn from normal use be-
cause of its breakdown, repair, servicing, loss or destruction." See Government
Employees Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 357 S.W.2d 548 (Ky. 1961) ; Fullilove v. United
States Cas. Co., 240 La. 859, 125 So. 2d 389 (1961), 21 LA. L. REV. 835. For
other policies to the same effect, see those involved in Canal Ins. Co. v. Brooks,
201 F. Supp. 124 (W.D. La. 1962); McKee v. Exchange Ins. Ass'n, 120 Ala.
690, 120 So. 2d 690 (1960); Little v. Safeguard Ins. Co., 137 So. 2d 415 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1962) ; Mid-Continent Cas. Co. v. West, 351 P.2d 398 (Okla. 1960)
Harte v. Peerless Ins. Co., 183 A.2d 223 (Vt. 1962).
For coverage of newly acquired automobiles provided by the more recent family
policy forms, see part (c) of the definition of an owned automobile in note 3
supra; Quaderer v. Integrity Mat. Ins. Co., 116 N.W.2d 605 (Minn. 1962);
Mathews v. Glen Falls Ins. Co., 192 N.Y.S.2d 811 (1959). For other policies to
the same effect, see Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. Universal Underwriters, 282
F.2d g4 (10th Cir. 1960) ; Canal Ins. Co. v. Brooks, 201 F. Supp. 124 (W.D.
La. 1962); Mullen v. Farm Bureau of LaSalle County, 21 Ill. App.2d 280, 157
N.E.2d 679 (1959) ; Norris v. Allstate Ins. Co., 34 N.J. 437, 170 A.2d 33 (1961) ;
Clow v. National Indem. Co., 54 Wash. 2d 198, 339 P.2d 82 (1959) ; APPLEMAN,
INSURANCE § 4293 (1962).
10. 107 So. 2d 509 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1959).
11. The policy involved in the Lejeune case was a standard policy outstanding
on the effective date of the new Family Automobile Policy in Louisiana (October
1, 1956). Pursuant to a directive from the Casualty and Surety Division of the
Louisiana Rating Commission, Bulletin 195, August 27, 1956, the insurer had
agreed with the Division to interpret outstanding standard policies as affording
the broader coverage of the family policy. The court in Lejeune blandly stated
that a specific endorsement must be attached to the family policy in order to ex-
clude any second automobile owned by the insured. 107 So. 2d at 524. Although
it was not specifically mentioned, the court evidently had reference to the exclu-
sionary endorsement rule of the Automobile Casualty Manual (not to be confused
with Bulletin 195 of the Division instructing that outstanding policies would be
construed as providing the broader coverage of the new family policy). Reasoning
that the policy now provided the coverage of the family policy and that the fam-
ily policy required an endorsement to exclude an owned automobile, the court
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here there was no such endorsement. The court further reasoned
that if coverage only extended to the automobile described in the
policy there would be no need for the provision requiring the in-
sured to notify the insurer of his acquisition of another ve-
hicle ;12 thus, the policy must have contemplated coverage of
such described automobiles.
Justice Hawthorne, dissenting, maintained there was no in-
tent that the policy's coverage should extend to automobiles
owned by the named insured on the effective date of the policy
and not so declared by him, relying on the policy provision that
unless otherwise stated the number of automobiles owned on the
effective date of the policy did not exceed the number of those
described therein; and that the premium in the instant case was
based on the insured's ownership of one car, not two. The dis-
senting Justice further argued that the provision requiring no-
tice of newly acquired automobiles had reference only to automo-
biles acquired during the policy period, thus indicating no intent
to insure owned vehicles acquired before the effective date of
the policy.13 As to the rules of the Automobile Casualty Manual,
the Justice maintained they were not a part of the insurance
contract and should not be decisive of its meaning.14
It may be arguable that due to its definition of an "owned
automobile" the policy was ambiguous, and thereby sustain the
majority's finding that it should be construed in favor of the
insured.' 5 However, it is submitted that the view taken by the
held that since there was no endorsement issued, the policy on a 1955 automobile
provided coverage for a 1947 automobile which was owned by the named insured
at the time of the issuance of the policy and for which no premium was paid.
12. This provision, under the heading of "Premium," is inserted so that there
might be a corresponding premium adjustment.
13. 142 So. 2d at 395.
14. Id. at 396. While it appears that the Commissioner of Insurance has
authority to promulgate rules and regulations to establish reasonable minimum
standard conditions for basic benefits in automobile liability insurance, see LA.
R.S. 22:211, 620, 621, 622 (1950), it would seem that such authority does not
include that to dictate the manner in which policies are to be construed. LA. R.S.
22:218 and 653 (1950) provide in essence that if a policy is issued not in com-
pliance with the provisions of the Insurance Code it shall be construed in ac-
cordance with the provisions as would have applied had it been issued in compli-
ance with the code. From reading the pertinent divisions of the Insurance Code,
however, one gets the impression that the interpretation directed by these sections
applies only to its statutory requirements and not to regulations issued by the
commissioner.
15. The general rule is that ambiguities in insurance contracts are construed
against the insurer as he has a better understanding of the subject and is the one
who drafts the policy. Toler v. All American Assur. Co., 237 La. 815, 112 So. 2d
623 (1959) ; Oil Well Supply Co. v. New York Life Ins. Co., 214 La. 772, 38
So. 2d 777 (1949); Stanley v. Cryer Drilling Co., 213 La. 980, 36 So. 2d 9
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dissenting Justice is probably more in accord with the intent of
the parties. The majority's theory would indicate that even if
the insured owned several automobiles, he might take out a pol-
icy on just one and all would receive full coverage, at least in the
absence of an intent to deceive.16
The particular problem presented in the instant case seems
to be remedied by the use of the new policy forms which provide
in substance that an owned automobile means an automobile de-
scribed in the policy, or a newly acquired automobile which re-
places a described automobile, or a newly acquired automobile
in addition to the described automobile when notice is given of
its acquisition within thirty days.17 Should similar problems
arise in ascertaining the intention of parties to automobile lia-
bility policies, however, it is submitted that an obvious correla-
tion between premium and risk should be among the factors
carefully weighed; if premiums are based on the ownership of
just one automobile, certainly neither party has reason to expect
uncompensated coverage for any other owned vehicle.
Wendell G. Lindsay, Jr.
OBLIGATIONS - ERROR AS TO SUBJECT MATTER - AVOIDANCE
OF INSURANCE RELEASES IN LOUISIANA
Plaintiff, injured in a collision between a train and the car
driven by her husband, sought damages for personal injury
from her husband's automobile insurer and the railroad. The
defendant insurer pleaded res judicata on the basis of a pur-
ported written release obtained by the insurer from plaintiff
and her husband. The defendant railroad filed an exception of
no right of action based on the alleged release of the co-tort-
feasor insurer.' Plaintiff sought to prove, by parol evidence,
(1948) Hemel v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 211 La. 95, 29 So. 2d 483
(1947) Muse v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 193 La. 605, 192 So. 72 (1939).
16. LA. R.S. 22:619 (1950) provides in part that "no oral or written mis-
representation or warranty made in the negotiation of an insurance contract ...
shall be deemed material or defeat or avoid the contract or prevent it from at-
taching, unless the misrepresentation or warranty is made with the intent to de-
ceive." Consequently, the presence of such intent would be necessary for the in-
correct declaration to cause avoidance of the contract on a theory of warranty.
See Comment, 22 LA. L. REV. 190 (1961).
17. See the definition of owned automobile in note 3 supra.
1. The release was granted only to the insurer of the automobile, but there
was no express reservation of rights in the release to sue the railroad company.
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